This paper studies the e¤ects that the revelation of information on the electorate's preferences has on voters'turnout decisions. The experimental data show that closeness in the division of preferences induces a signi…cant increase in turnout. Moreover, for closely divided electorates (and only for these electorates) the provision of information signi…cantly raises the participation of subjects supporting the slightly larger team relative to the smaller team. We show that the heterogeneous e¤ect of information on the participation of subjects in di¤erent teams is driven by the subjects' (incorrect) beliefs of casting a pivotal vote. Simply put, subjects overestimate the probability of casting a pivotal vote when they belong to the team with a slight majority, and choose the strategy that maximizes their utility based on their in ‡ated probability assessment. Empirical evidence on gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1990 and 2005 is consistent with our main experimental result. Namely, we observe that the di¤erence in the actual vote tally between the party leading according to the polls and the other party is larger than the one predicted by the polls only in closely divided electorates. We provide a behavioral model that explains the main …ndings of our experimental and empirical analyses.
Introduction
In large electorates the probability of casting a pivotal vote is close to zero regardless of the actual distribution of preferences. A poll pointing to an evenly split electorate, however, may a¤ect the voters' beliefs on the probability of casting a pivotal vote and, therefore, the voters'turnout decisions. 1 Indeed, a lively debate is being carried in several countries on whether or not polls a¤ect electoral results. A fundamental di¢ culty when trying to empirically assess the causal e¤ect of public opinion polls on the individuals' turnout decisions is that of omitted variables. Several factors, like valence characteristics of candidates and their chosen platforms, a¤ect not only individuals'turnout but also the public opinion polls.
This paper analyses experimentally and empirically the impact that the provision of information on the electorate's distribution of preferences has on the voters'participation decisions. 2 Our experiment compares the subjects'participation decisions in an election when they know the exact distribution of preferences of the electorate to their decisions when they only know their own preferences. Our objective is to uncover any behavioral e¤ects that the provision of information may have on the voters. Additionally, we collected, through a survey administered at the beginning and at the end of our experiment, the 1 In the last presidential elections in the U.S., for example, individual voters that supported Ralph Nader and resided in states where the election was predicted to be close traded their votes with John Kerry's supporters that lived in states where the election was expected to be lopsided in favor of one candidate. People that traded votes felt that now their vote "really counted." As related in votepair.org/stories: "I live in Utah. The most republican state in the nation. I happen to be a democrat who voted for Gore. My vote did not count because of the stupid electoral college. By swapping my vote, I can …nally have my vote count for a democrat."
2 See Goeree and Groß er (2005) and Taylor and Yildirim (2005) for recent theoretical studies of the e¤ects of information on the electorate's behavior. subjects'estimated probabilities of casting a pivotal vote for all the di¤erent distributions of preferences. This allow us to assess whether the subjects'behavior is a consequence of their beliefs or despite thereof.
The experimental results show that closeness in the division of preferences induces a signi…cant increase in turnout. Perhaps more surprisingly, in closely divided electorates (and only for these electorates) the provision of information signi…cantly raises the participation of subjects supporting the slightly larger team relative to the smaller team -we refer to this behavior as the bandwagon e¤ect of polls. This behavior contradicts the qualitative predictions of the unique quasi-symmetric equilibrium of the theoretical model underlying the experiments. According to the equilibrium conditions the provision of information on the electorate's preferences should induce voters in the majority to participate less frequently because they free ride on the voting of other individuals supporting the same alternative. At the same time polls should stimulate the participation of voters in the minority to o¤set the advantage of the other alternative. These requirements of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium seem counter-intuitive and are not supported by the experimental data. 3 To uncover the root causes behind the bandwagon e¤ect of polls we incorporate into the analysis the subjects'responses to the surveys. This analysis shows that the heterogeneous e¤ect of information on the participation of subjects in di¤erent teams is driven by the subjects'(incorrect) beliefs of casting a pivotal vote. Simply put, subjects overestimate the probability of casting a pivotal vote when they belong to the team with a slight majority, and choose the strategy that maximizes their utility based on their in ‡ated probability assessment. This conjecture was …rst formalized by Riker and Ordeshook (1967) . To the best of our knowledge, the current paper is the …rst attempt to formally test this hypothesis.
The observed bandwagon e¤ect of polls is consistent with previous experimental studies. While studying the incidence of reform in the presence of individual-speci…c uncertainty, Cason and Miu (2005) …nd that the participation rates of the majority are higher than the participation rates of the minority. In an independent study, Groß er et al. (2005) examine the welfare implications of endogenous voter participation using a di¤erent experimental design that includes ‡oating voters. They also …nd that the majority participates more than the minority but this di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant. Their experimental design allows them to test this hypothesis only using the electorate as the unit of observation. Our experiment, like Cason and Miu's (2005) , is especially designed to use the subjects as our unit of observation, granting us the possibility to di¤erentiate between distributions with enough observations for each one to be able to perform statistically meaningful tests.
Finally, Levine and Palfrey (2005) experimentally test the predictions of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) whereby participation costs are heterogeneous and privately known.
They …nd that subjects in the small team vote with higher frequency than subjects in the large team. Unlike our experimental design, theirs doesn't directly test for the e¤ects of the provision of information. Perhaps more importantly, their study [as well as that of Groß er et al. (2005) ] reveals the exact vote tally at the end of each round thus allowing the subjects to gain experience and learn over rounds. This was done in order to check whether the subjects'behavior converges with experience to the one predicted by the pure strategy equilibrium of the game they analyzed. This paper's objective is not to examine the predictions of a particular model, but rather to reveal the individuals'behavioral reactions to the publication of public opinion polls. Therefore, we use a random and anonymous reassignment procedure speci…cally to reduce repeated game incentives and minimize the e¤ects of learning. We believe this is the right experimental design given the objectives of our study.
We test the external validity of our main experimental result using a newly culled data set on gubernatorial elections in the U.S. since 1990. For these purposes we use as our proxy to closeness in the distribution of preferences the results of pre-election polls published by newspapers within one week before the elections. The observed evidence is consistent with the experimental results. Namely, in elections where the polls pointed to a narrow margin between the two parties the di¤erence in the elections'vote share of the two parties is greater than the di¤erence predicted by the polls. The e¤ect above is not present in electoral contests that were expected to be lopsided according to the polls' predictions.
The individuals' behavioral pattern has signi…cant implications in two di¤erent contexts. The immediate one is in the context of voting, where our results point to an interesting behavioral phenomenon that has been overlooked by the related literature. This behavior has important implications on the widespread policy debate on the desirability 6 of publishing polls close to an election date. On the one hand, supporters of the ban claim that the observed inclination of people to vote for candidates leading in the surveys may lead to the manipulation of polls before elections by parties with vested interests. On the other hand, opponents to the measure claim that a ban on polls before elections suppresses the freedom of expression. 4 Experimentally, we show that the bandwagon e¤ect is a direct consequence of higher voter participation and not necessarily of voters changing their preferences. This suggests that a policy geared to increase voters'participation can substantially o¤set the e¤ects of polls.
The observed phenomenon has also broader implications regarding the empirical relevance of mixed strategy equilibria in more general setups. When a player can choose between two alternatives she may use a mixed strategy only when she is indi¤erent between the two. In an asymmetric environment as the one proposed here, players in the small team would be indi¤erent between voting and abstaining only if players in the large team vote with a relatively lower frequency than players of the small team. Moreover, each player should have the correct beliefs regarding the mixed strategies used by the rest of the players. The equilibrium strategies (and beliefs) are not necessarily intuitive, especially in setups with only slight di¤erences between the players. Thus, for these conditions to hold behaviorally probably requires that the game is played with a considerable amount of repetition to facilitate experience and learning.
We propose an alternative theoretical explanation that relaxes Nash equilibrium but is consistent with the voters'beliefs and behavior observed in the laboratory. In particular,
we show that if individuals believe that in a close election the probability of voting is su¢ ciently high and similar for every voter regardless of team sizes, then optimal behavior with respect to these beliefs gives rise to voting patterns consistent with the ones observed in the current study. While these beliefs cannot be part of equilibrium with groups of unequal sizes, they are consistent with the documented departures from quasi-symmetric equilibrium strategies in other contexts as well.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical framework underlying our experiment. A detailed description of our experimental design appears in Section 3. Section 4 shows the main experimental results of the paper. Section 5 test the external validity of our experimental results. We present an alternative theoretical explanation for the subjects behavior in Section 6. The last section of the paper concludes.
The proof of our theoretical result appears in the appendix.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework we consider is based on the seminal contribution of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) . There are n risk neutral individuals (n 3). Individuals have to decide between two alternatives fA; Bg. The alternative is chosen via simple plurality rule; that is, the alternative with the greater number of votes is chosen. In the event of a tie each alternative is selected with equal probability. This is a collective choice problem:
the chosen alternative applies to all the individuals. V and C are common knowledge and identical to all the individuals. We assume that
In this setup, a rational individual votes if and only if
where P denotes the probability that individual i's preferred alternative is chosen and s j6 =i is a pro…le that describes the strategy of all the individuals excluding individual i:
Clearly, a rational individual participates in the election only if, given the other individuals'strategies, her participation a¤ects the probability that her preferred alternative is chosen. In other words, an individual may turn out to vote only when she is pivotal.
We analyze the game above under two di¤erent frameworks regarding the individuals' information about the distribution of preferences. The …rst scenario focuses on a symmetric private value model of voting. Accordingly, each voter knows the alternative that she favors and that the probability that any other individual prefers any given alternative is the same for both alternatives. The individuals'probability distributions are stochastically independent.
We focus on symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) as the relevant equilibrium concept for the symmetric private value model of voting. This equilibrium concept assumes that the every individual's decision to participate is independent of the alternative that she favors because of the symmetric common prior over the individuals'distribution of preferences; that is, all the individuals randomize between voting for their preferred alternative and abstaining with the same probability. (A formal de…nition appears in Appendix A.)
In the second scenario the number of voters favoring each alternative is commonly known. This is exactly the framework analyzed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) . This complete information game has multiple Nash equilibria. The solution concept that generates unique predictions for the game is that of totally quasi-symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (QSNE). According to this equilibrium concept all the individuals supporting the same alternative are using the same strategy. Moreover, this strategy involves voting with a probability strictly between zero and one. Note that, unlike the BNE, in the QSNE individuals supporting di¤erent alternatives are not necessarily mixing with the same probability. (See Appendix A for a formal de…nition of this equilibrium concept.)
For the purposes of our experimental study we focus on electorates of seven individuals and set V = 10 and C = 4: We choose an odd number of participants in each electorate to rule out equilibrium in pure strategies (except for the case where all the participants share the same preferences). When the subjects know the distribution of preferences symmetric equilibria do not exist for this con…guration either. In fact, with seven players and two alternatives there exists a unique totally mixed QSNE and a unique totally mixed symmetric BNE. Table 1 provides the point predictions for the unique BNE and QSNE.
[ Table 1 about here]
Note that in the QSNE for every distribution of preferences individuals in the minority vote with higher probability than individuals in the majority. This result is a direct consequence of the mixed strategies equilibrium's requirement that individuals'should be indi¤erent between voting and abstaining. Since individuals would be willing to vote only if the probability of casting a pivotal vote is positive, they have to expect that with a high enough probability the number of votes in support for each team would be equal, or di¤er by only one vote. To satisfy that requirement individuals supporting the large team should vote with lower probability than individuals supporting the small team.
Experimental Design
The experiment was run at the RatioLab -The Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The 84 subjects in this experiment were recruited from the pool of undergraduate and graduate students from The Hebrew University and had no previous experience in experiments related to voters'participation.
In each session 21 subjects participated as voters. The experiments were conducted via computers. Before the experiment started an experimental administrator read the instructions aloud. We also asked several hypothetical questions at the end of the instructions to check subjects' comprehension of the procedure (the instructions and the questionnaire are located in Appendix B). The experiment began after all subjects had solved all questions successfully. The experiment lasted for about ninety minutes. Each subject received 80 tokens as a participation fee and subsequent earnings according to the payo¤s speci…ed in the experiment. Average earnings were equal to 244 tokens. We converted each token to NIS 0.25 and paid the subjects in cash in private at the end of the session. 6 Throughout the experiment we ensured anonymity and e¤ectively isolated each subject in a cubicle to minimize any interpersonal in ‡uence that could stimulate uniformity of behavior. Communication among subjects was not allowed throughout the session.
Each experimental session entailed 20 independent rounds. In each round we randomly divided 21 subjects into three electorates of seven participants each. At the beginning of each round an equal probability rule randomly assigned each subject to one of two teams:
Green or Blue. A subject earns 10 tokens if the team she prefers is selected by majority voting in an election. Voting entails a cost of 4 tokens.
The sequence of events is as follows. Subjects know that the round is divided into two stages, and that each subject will decide whether to vote or abstain in each stage.
Every subject knows that her decision in one stage is independent from her decision in the other stage. In the …rst stage of each round each subject knows only her preferred color. She decides whether to vote or abstain. After all the participants make their decisions we proceed to the second stage of the round. In this stage subjects are told the electorate's distribution of preferences. Note that subjects don't receive any information on the subjects'participation decisions in the round's …rst stage. Subjects have to decide again whether or not to vote. After all the subjects choose an action, they learn the selected teams of the …rst and second elections, their corresponding payo¤s for the round, and their cumulative payo¤s -no information is provided on the number of subjects that voted for a given team. Ties are always broken by an equal probability rule. At the end of each round subjects are randomly reshu-ed between electorates and each subject's preferred color is again randomly decided.
In addition to playing this game each subject completed a survey that asked her to assess the probability of casting a pivotal vote for each possible team size. Every subject completed the same survey twice -before the beginning of the …rst round and after …nishing the last round.
Experimental Results
This section presents the e¤ects of revealing information about the electorate's distribution of preferences on the subjects'turnout decisions. To clarify the exposition we divide this section into two subsections. The …rst subsection presents the basic results on the impact of information provision on subjects'participation decisions. The second subsection reports 13 the results taking into account not only subjects'actions but also their beliefs.
For all the tests reported below the unit of observation is the subject. For the nonparametric tests we consider, for each subject, the average across all the di¤erent rounds. This eliminates possible correlations across repeated observations of a given subject. Therefore, the statistics reported are averages of the subjects'averages. In the regression analysis, however, we use all the available data, adopting a random e¤ects speci…cation with the subject as the random factor. Figure 1 depicts the average turnout rate before the provision of information and the average turnout rate after information is revealed, as a function of the di¤erent distribution of preferences. The …gure also includes the equilibrium's predicted turnout rate.
The E¤ect of Information on Subjects'Turnout Decisions
[ Figure 1 about here]
The …gure clearly indicates that closeness in the division of preferences induces a signi…cant increase in turnout. Whereas the average turnout rate before the provision of information is slightly below 25 percent, the average turnout rate for a distribution of teams of sizes three and four is 40 percent (the di¤erence between the two is statistically signi…cant with z = 3:125; p < 0:001; two-sided sign test using the normal approximation to the binomial distribution).
The provision of information for other divisions of the electorates doesn't have a signif-14 icant impact on the subjects'turnout relative to their turnout rates before the provision of information (p > 0:8 when the division of teams is …ve versus two; p > 0:65 when the division is six versus one; and p > 0:8 when the division is seven versus zero, all according to a two-sided sign test). Moreover, the observed rates aren't substantially di¤erent from the equilibrium's prediction. The turnout rate is higher than the equilibrium's prediction for distributions of seven versus zero and …ve versus two, whereas turnout is lower than the equilibrium's prediction for a distribution of six versus one. For closely divided preferences, on the contrary, we observe important quantitative di¤erences between the subjects'turnout and the predictions of the theoretical model underlying the experiment. 7 Although Figure 1 reveals a clear and signi…cant e¤ect of closeness on participation, the …gure masks important and unexpected di¤erences between teams for a given distribution of preferences. The heterogeneous e¤ect of closeness between teams is presented in Figure   2 , which decomposes turnout as a function of the size of the teams. Note that a team of size j implies that the distribution of the electorate's preferences is (j; 7 j):
This …gure shows the most startling e¤ect that emerges from our experiment: For closely divided electorates the e¤ect of information on voter participation is not homogenous across teams of di¤erent sizes. In particular, the provision of information signi…cantly raises the participation of voters supporting the slightly larger team relative to the participation of voters supporting the smaller team, thus a¤ecting the election's results. 7 The correlation between closeness and turnout observed in the laboratory is consistent with results in the related empirical literature [see, for example, Shachar and Nalebu¤ (1999)]. Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) show that this correlation can be explained using a model where voters have ethical preferences. Coate and Conlin (2004) provide empirical evidence supporting the ethical voters approach.
[ Figure 2 about here]
In other words, for closely divided electorates revealing information on subjects'preferences causes an important increase on the participation of all the subjects: Subjects that belong to teams of size three and four vote more often after learning the distribution of preferences. The e¤ect, however, is stronger for subjects that belong to the slightly larger team. The turnout rate for subjects that belong to a team with four supporters is more than twenty percent higher than the turnout rate of subjects that belong to a team of three. This behavior contradicts the quantitative and qualitative predictions of the theoretical model. Accordingly, members of the minority should vote with a higher probability than the members of the majority to o¤set the advantage of the majority.
Moreover, the provision of information should induce a decrease in the turnout rate of the majority because of free riding of its members.
We don't observe a similar e¤ect for electorates with a more lopsided division of preferences. For electorates that aren't closely divided, revealing the distribution of preferences doesn't a¤ect the turnout rate of subjects supporting the small team but lowers the turnout of subjects supporting the large team. For example, we see an important decrease in the participation of subjects after learning that they belong to a team of size seven. A similar phenomenon occurs for subjects that belong to a team of six subjects. Note that these subjects turn out in a frequency lower than the frequency of a subject that is the sole supporter of an alternative. An analogous situation occurs when the subjects'preferences are divided between teams of …ve and two members. This behavior, which seems to be a consequence of free riding, is in accordance with the equilibrium's predictions.
The di¤erent e¤ect of closeness on subjects conditional on the size of the team they support is evident from the estimation of the following participation equation:
where 1f g is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the left hand side of the inequality inside the brackets is greater than or equal to zero, and 0 otherwise; V ote_Inf i;t re ‡ects subject i's participation decision in the second stage of round t after the provision of information on the distribution of preferences. The covariates account for the subject's decision in the …rst stage of round t before the provision of information (V ote_N oInf i;t ), and whether or not the subject belongs to the large team in an electoral contest (M ajority i;t ).
We also include in the analysis a time trend (round t ) to capture the fact that subjects may systematically change their strategy as a consequence of learning from round to round; and a subject speci…c constant e¤ect ( i ) that captures random disturbances (constant through time) that characterize subject i:
We estimate equation (4.1) separately for each di¤erent distribution of subjects'preferences using a random e¤ects probit estimation.
8 Table 2 presents the estimated coe¢ cients.
[ Table 2 about here]
The table quanti…es the most striking of our results: When the electorate is closely divided, the provision of information on subjects'preferences signi…cantly raises the participation of subjects in the majority relative to the minority. The team size e¤ect when the electorate is divided into teams of three versus four subjects is positive, large in value relative to the other coe¢ cients and statistically signi…cant. It increases the probability of voting by slightly over 10 percent for the average subject. We also observe a signi…cant negative e¤ect of rounds, pointing to a learning process that induces subjects to reduce their participation in elections. 9 Interestingly, subjects'participation decision in the …rst stage of each round doesn't explain their actions after the provision of information.
The subjects'behavior is qualitatively di¤erent when the di¤erence in the number of supporters for each team is relatively large. When the di¤erence in the number of supporters is of three or …ve subjects the provision of information doesn't a¤ect the participation of subjects in the majority any di¤erently than it a¤ects the participation of subjects in the minority. For these groups compositions, moreover, the number of rounds elapsed doesn't a¤ect participation.
Contrary to closely divided groups, when the di¤erence in the number of supporters for each team is relatively large the best predictor for subjects' participation decisions 9 We test the same model including the interaction between majority and number of rounds as an additional covariate. The coe¢ cient for this covariate is not signi…cant; thus, the signi…cant di¤erences between majority and minority don't disappear over rounds.
after the provision of information is the subjects'actions in the …rst stage of each round.
That is, there are subjects that reveal a preference for participation in the …rst stage, and therefore these subjects are the ones turning out to vote in the second stage when the electorate's preferences are not closely divided. This seems to be particularly the case in very lopsided contests (6 versus 1) where the coe¢ cient of the …rst stage decision is not only highly statistically signi…cant, but also large in value relative to the other coe¢ cients.
The probability of voting in the second stage is 30 percent higher for the average subject that belongs to a team of size one and voted in the …rst stage relative to the average subject that didn't vote in the …rst stage. The marginal e¤ect of voting in the …rst stage on the probability of voting in the second stage is 24 percent for subjects in teams of size 6.
The fact that the provision of information signi…cantly raises the participation of subjects in the majority relative to the minority in closely divided electorates not only contradicts the intuitions behind the mixed strategies Nash equilibrium concept but also those of the alternative quantal response equilibrium concept. Interestingly, however, the quantal response equilibrium predicts that the observed participation rate should be higher (lower) than that predicted by the Nash equilibrium when the participation rate predicted by the Nash equilibrium is below (above) 0.5 (Goeree and Holt, 2005 ). This prediction is borne out by the data both before and after the provision of information. Moreover, this prediction …nds additional support in the next section where we analyze the subjects' beliefs.
The E¤ect of Subjects'Beliefs on Their Turnout Decisions
This subsection incorporates into the analysis the surveys'answers to better account for the subjects'strategies. As already pointed out, these surveys, conducted at the beginning and at the end of the experiment, asked every subject to quantify the probability of casting a pivotal vote for every possible distribution of preferences. Theoretically, the equilibrium probability of casting a pivotal vote depends only on 2C=V -the voting cost divided by half the bene…ts of a victory of the subject's preferred alternative. Given that we hold both constant, the equilibrium's predicted probability of casting a pivotal vote is constant as well regardless of the distribution of preferences. (In our application with a bene…t of 10 tokens and a cost of 4 tokens this probability is equal to 0.8). [ Figure 3 about here] Figure 3 shows that subjects grossly miscalculate the probability of casting a pivotal vote. Quantitatively, the subjects state a probability much lower than the theoretical and actual probabilities. Qualitatively, subjects' beliefs seem to be strongly a¤ected by the distribution of preferences across teams. A low probability is attributed to situations 20 with a large di¤erence in the number of supporters between the two teams, whereas the probability shows an important increase for closely divided teams. On average, the subjects stated a probability of 36.14% (with a standard deviation of 21.41%) of casting a pivotal vote when the di¤erence between the teams is one. The stated probability decreases to 25.54% and 20.48% as the di¤erences in team sizes increases to three and …ve respectively (the corresponding standard deviations are 17.53% and 18.01%). For teams of size seven the reported probability is 23.04% (the standard deviation is 27.08%). The subjects' estimates for a close distribution of preferences is signi…cantly di¤erent than their estimates for the rest of the distributions (p < 0:001).
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It follows from the previous subsection (see Figure 2) that not only subjects'beliefs of casting a pivotal vote are relatively higher for closely divided electorates, but also their propensity to vote increases for these electorates. As a consequence, the actual probability of casting a pivotal vote decreases in closely divided electorates. Hence, an increase in the subjects'beliefs of casting a pivotal vote brings about a decrease in the actual probability of being pivotal.
For a given distribution of preferences subjects, for the most part, attach a higher probability of casting a pivotal vote when they belong to the majority relative to the probability attached when subjects belong to the minority. 11 Contrary to our results from the previous section the di¤erences are statistically signi…cant for every distribution of preferences. The p-value that subjects in the majority state a higher probability of casting a pivotal vote than subjects in the minority is below 0.04 for a distribution of four versus three subjects. This value decreases to 0.03 and to 0.003 as the di¤erence between the teams increases to three and …ve, respectively.
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A comparison of the subjects'beliefs and their participation decisions leads us to conjecture that the subjects'behavior is at least partially accounted by their beliefs. Simply put, subjects may overestimate the likelihood of casting a pivotal vote and act rationally based on their in ‡ated probability assessment. To test this hypothesis we estimate equation (4.1) replacing M ajority i;t , the explanatory variable that captured the relative e¤ect of belonging to the majority, by each subject's beliefs of casting a pivotal vote conditional on the size of the subject's team.
The estimated coe¢ cients appear on Column (2) of Table 2 . The results are qualitatively similar to the ones observed in Column (1); that is, subjects' beliefs explain their behavior only when the distribution of preferences is closely divided between the two teams. Intuitively, in close elections subjects believe that there is a higher probability of casting a pivotal vote when they belong to the majority; these beliefs lead subjects to increase their relative frequency of voting when they indeed belong to the large group.
Quantitatively, however, the coe¢ cient for the subjects' beliefs is smaller than the coe¢ cient estimated in Column (1). In particular, a ten percentage point increase in the belief of casting a pivotal vote when belonging to a team of size four causes a …ve percent increase in the probability of voting of the average subject.
When the sizes of the teams aren't closely divided the subjects' beliefs don't play a signi…cant role in their participation decision. In these situations, as was concluded before, the best predictor for a subject's participation in the second stage of a round is the subject's action in the …rst stage of the round.
The next section tests the external validity of our main experimental observation using data from gubernatorial elections in the U.S.
Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections in the US
This section's exercise is mainly intended to assess the external validity of our main experimental result. Using a newly culled data set on gubernatorial elections in the U.S. we test whether, in close elections, the di¤erence in the actual vote tally between the party slightly leading according to the polls and the other party is larger than the one predicted by the polls. This hypothesis emanates directly from our experimental results and, to the best of our knowledge, has never been addressed in the vast extant empirical literature on voter turnout.
For the purposes of our empirical exercise we use as our proxy for closeness in the distribution of preferences the results of pre-election polls on gubernatorial races in the U.S., between 1990 and 2005. These polls, conducted by an independent polling …rm (Mason-Dixon Polling and Research, Inc.), were published by newspaper media within 23 one week before the elections. 13 The polls are supposed to be extremely accurate. They are published right before the elections and report results based only on likely voters.
Therefore, the polls already incorporate other factors that a¤ect participation (e.g. candi-
dates'spending and mobilizations'e¤ects). Hence, any systematic di¤erence between the polls and the electoral results may be attributed, at least partially, to e¤ects that the poll has on the electorate -e¤ects that were not taken into account by the polling company. The table di¤erentiates between elections where the di¤erence in the support between the two parties according to the polls was less than 10 percentage points and the rest of the elections. 15 [ Table 3 about here]
The table clearly illustrates the main di¤erence between closely divided electorates and the rest. The mean di¤erence between DE and DP is positive for elections expected to be close and negative for the rest of the elections. Moreover, the mean deviation between the electoral results and the polls'predictions is higher, in absolute value, for closely divided electorates than for the rest of the electorates (0.0154 and -0.0071 percentage points, respectively) even though the latter group of elections has a higher variance. [ Figure 4 about here] 15 The chosen cuto¤ of 10 percent is the level of closeness that emerges endogenously from the analysis below.
25
The observed pattern in Figure 4 is consistent with our experimental results. Accordingly, for polls pointing to a narrow margin between the candidates we observe a bandwagon e¤ect, whereby supporters of the leading candidate increase their participation relative to supporters of the trailing candidate.
16 This is the case for polls predicting a di¤erence smaller than 22 percentage points between the two parties. The bandwagon e¤ect is particularly strong for DP values between 4 and 10 percentage points. In this range DE DP is statistically greater than zero at the 2.5% signi…cance level. 17 In electoral contests that are expected to be one-sided the above e¤ect isn't present.
For these contests the predicted value of DE DP is decreasing as the di¤erence in the support for the two parties according to the polls increases. As predicted by the theoretical models, free riding of supporters of the large party seems to be behind the negative slope of DE DP in lopsided divided electorates.
Summing up, the evidence presented above is consistent with our experimental results.
We need to stress that the empirical analysis is correlational in nature -it can't by itself establish causality. Combined with our experimental results, however, the empirical evidence strengthens the case for the existence of a bandwagon e¤ect of public opinion polls in closely divided electorates. 16 One may think that the publication of the poll may not only a¤ect the voters'participation decision but their preferences as well. Since we restrict our attention to polls published within one week of the actual elections we believe that this e¤ect isn't of an important magnitude. 17 If we restrict the estimation to be linear DE DP is statistically greater than zero at the 2.5% signi…cance level for every DP value lower than 0.1.
A Behavioral Model
Our main experimental results, con…rmed using data on gubernatorial elections, cannot be accounted by the traditional rational choice approach to turnout. The results therefore call for an alternative behavioral explanation.
An alternative speci…cation of the voters' utility function may help explain part of the behavior observed in the laboratory. According to the traditional approach each voter's bene…t and cost of participation aren't a¤ected by whether the voter is in the losing or winning side of the contest. Several papers, mainly interested in models of sequential voting, modify the voters' utility function to take into account the fact that voters experience a desire to vote for the winner (on top of the costs and bene…ts explicit in rational choice models). 18 This approach, while able to explain bandwagons, assumes that the very behavior we need to explain is good for the voters. Moreover, the approach doesn't account for the stark di¤erence observed in the voters'behavior between elections expected to be close and the rest of the elections.
In this section we propose an alternative approach that relaxes Nash equilibrium but is consistent with the voters'beliefs and behavior observed in the laboratory. The Nash equilibrium concept requires that players optimize with respect to beliefs which are consistent with the actual strategies of players. As we have already pointed out no such combination can support the behavior we observe in our …ndings. Our experimental results may be consistent with a weaker notion of rationality. Are there "reasonable" beliefs that we can attribute to voters under which voters' best responses will be akin to the observed behavior (without these beliefs being consistent with the actual voters'strategies)?
Herein we present a set of reasonable beliefs which will satisfy these conditions: If voters believe that in a close election the probability of voting is similar for all the individuals and those probabilities are su¢ ciently high, then optimal behavior with respect to these beliefs gives rise to voting patterns consistent with the ones documented in the previous sections. Formally, Proposition 1: Suppose individuals believe that voters in the majority vote with probability q and voters in the minority vote with probability r; with jq rj < "; for some su¢ ciently small " > 0: If r 1=2 the probability of casting a pivotal vote is higher for a voter in the majority than for a voter in the minority.
To illustrate the intuition behind the proposition let us consider the case of a closely divided electorate when individuals believe that r is close to one. In this case, an individual that supports the large team believes it is very likely that her vote may break a tie. On the contrary, an individual that supports the small team believes that her team will loose the election regardless of her choice. Thus, under the conditions of Proposition 1 individuals believe that there is a higher probability of casting a pivotal vote when they support the large team. This result is consistent with the beliefs stated by the subjects in their answers to the surveys. 19 The main condition behind Proposition 1 is the individuals' beliefs that all voters mix with similar probabilities. Although these beliefs cannot be part of equilibrium with groups of unequal sizes, they seem reasonable when the preferences of the electorate are almost equally split between the two alternatives. This may explain why the bandwagon e¤ect of polls occurs only when the electorate is closely divided.
Conclusions
This paper studies the e¤ect that information on the voters' distribution of preferences has on turnout. The main …nding is that the observed increase in turnout when the distribution of preferences is closely divided is heterogenous across teams of di¤erent sizes.
In particular, the increase in turnout is signi…cantly larger for the alternative with a slight majority according to the poll. That is, polls have a bandwagon e¤ect whereby the frontrunner alternative increases its relative support in the elections. This e¤ect, observed only in close elections, is not a consequence of voters changing their preferences. Rather, it is entirely driven by individuals that already supported the leading team voting with a relatively higher frequency.
We showed that the bandwagon e¤ect of polls in closely divided electorates is a direct consequence of the subjects' beliefs. That is, for closely divided electorates we observe that subjects overestimate the probability of casting a pivotal vote and behave according to those beliefs. On the contrary, subjects'beliefs don't explain their actions in electorates that are lopsided divided. Rather, only subjects that voted with high frequencies regardless 29 of their beliefs or the distribution of preferences are the ones that participate in lopsided elections. This paper documented the bandwagon e¤ect not only in the laboratory but also using data from U.S. gubernatorial elections in the last …fteen years.
It is noteworthy that the bandwagon e¤ect cannot be accounted by the intuitions derived from theoretical models on the e¤ect of public opinion polls on turnout. This theory is based on rational individuals holding the correct beliefs for every distribution of preferences. Hereby we proposed an alternative explanation consistent with the voters'beliefs and behavior observed in the laboratory. In particular, we presented a set of reasonable beliefs that can be attributed to voters under which utility maximization yields a behavioral pattern consistent with the bandwagon e¤ect of polls in closely divided electorates.
Summing up, this paper discovered an anomalous behavioral pattern in the laboratory;
it corroborated the external validity of this behavior for large electorates; and it presented an alternative rationale for the prevalence of bandwagon e¤ects in close elections. Clearly, much work remains to be done for us to be able to understand what causes this e¤ect.
Currently, we are exploring the prevalence of this e¤ect in general environments. It seems that subjects don't fully take into account information on an ex-post asymmetric distribution in environments that are ex-ante symmetric. This conjecture, if validated in the laboratory, has implications far beyond the context of voters'turnout.
Appendix A
De…nition of Totally Mixed Strategies Symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: Let us denote by n A the number of voters that prefer alternative A and n B the number of voters that prefer alternative B, with n A + n B = n: A totally mixed strategies symmetric BNE in this context corresponds to a probability of voting that satis…es the following two conditions:
where
denotes the probability that a voter that supports alternative A is pivotal when the rest of the voters vote with probability : Similarly,
denotes the probability that a voter that supports alternative B is pivotal when the rest of the voters vote with probability : Thus, conditions (A.1) and (A.2) state that a voting probability is a totally mixed symmetric BNE if and only if every individual is indi¤erent between voting and abstaining.
De…nition of Totally Quasi-Symmetric Mixed Strategies Nash Equilibrium:
As de…ned by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, pp. 27 ), a pair of voting strategies ( A ; B ) is a totally quasi-symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if
where the right hand side of (A.3) is simply the probability that a voter supporting alternative A is pivotal when the rest of the voters supporting A vote with probability A and all the voters supporting B vote with probability B . Similarly, the right hand side of (A.4) is the probability that a voter supporting alternative B is pivotal when all the voters supporting A vote with probability A and the rest of the voters supporting B vote with probability B . Therefore, (A.3) states a su¢ cient and necessary condition for A to be a best response to B and (A.4) states a su¢ cient and necessary condition for B to 35 be a best response to A .
Proof of Proposition 1: Let us assume that there are n voters, with n > 3 and odd.
Let us say that n A of the voters prefer alternative A and n B of them prefer alternative B; with n A + n B = n and n A < n B : Assume …rst that r = q: The probability that an individual that prefers alternative A is pivotal equals
where the …rst term is the probability of observing a tie and the second term is the probability that alternative A loses the election by one vote. Similarly, the probability that an individual that prefers alternative B is pivotal equals
Therefore, rearranging terms we can express the probability that an individual supporting B will break a tie minus the probability that an individual supporting A will break a tie
Similarly, subtracting from the second term of (A.5) the second term of (A.6) we obtain
Thus, the probability of casting a pivotal vote is greater when an individual supports the majority group B if and only if (A.7) is greater than (A.8); this is equivalent to
This inequality is satis…ed if, and only if, q > 1=2: The more general result for r 6 = q with jq rj < "; for some " > 0 follows immediately from the fact that the probability of casting a pivotal vote is continuous on q and r.
1 APPENDIX B
Experiment in Decision-Making
This is an experiment in decision-making. During the experiment, you will make decisions and the other participants will do so as well. Your decisions and the others' will determine the payment that you will receive according to rules that we will explain later on. You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment, exactly as the rules say. Twenty-one people are participating in the experiment. The experiment will be conducted by means of computers. All decisions that you make during the experiment will be implemented by keying appropriate commands.
Please remain totally silent during the experiment and do not speak with the other participants. If you have a question of any kind, raise your hand and one of the supervisors will come over to you.
The experiment is composed of several rounds. Each round has two phases-Phase 1 and Phase 2.
At the beginning of the experiment, the twenty-one participants will be divided up randomly, by the computer, into three groups of seven participants apiece. You will not know whom among the other participants in the room belongs to your group. Each group plays among its own members only and is independent of the other groups in the room.
At the beginning of the experiment, each participant receives a participation fee of 80 tokens.
At the beginning of each round, each participant receives a message from the computer about whether the participant prefers the choice of the blue color or of the green color. The computer performs a separate draw for each participant as to his or her preference of the color to be chosen. Each color, green or blue, has a 50 percent probability of being chosen.
After the computer tells you which color you prefer-blue or green-you will be asked to make decisions: a. In Phase 1 of the game, you will have to decide whether to vote for the color that you prefer. For your decision to vote for the color that you prefer, you will pay four tokens. In Phase 1 of the game, you will be given no information about the color preferences of the other members of your group. After you make a decision, the computer will immediately move on to Phase 2 of the game. b. In Phase 2 of the game, you will receive information about the color preferences of the members of your group. For example, you will be told that two players in your group prefer to see the blue color chosen and that five members of your group prefer to see green chosen. Then you will be asked to decide whether to vote for the color that you prefer. For your decision to vote for the color that you prefer, you will pay four tokens. At the end of Phase 2 of the game, the computer will collect the seven decisions of the members of your group and determine which color was chosen in Phase 1 of the game and which color was chosen in Phase 2 of the game. The color chosen is the one for which a majority of the group members votes.
If the color that you preferred was chosen in Phase 1, you will receive ten tokens, and the other members of the group who preferred this color will also receive ten tokens-whether they voted for it or not.
If the color that you preferred was chosen in Phase 2, you will receive ten tokens, and the other members of the group who preferred this color will also receive ten tokens-whether they voted for it or not. Note: The fact that many members of the group prefer a certain color does not mean that this color will be chosen. For a color to be chosen, it must receive an actual majority of votes. If all seven members of the group decide not to vote for the colors that they prefer, the computer will select at random the color of choice in the respective phase of the game. The computer will do the same in the case of a tie vote among group members between green and blue. Each color, green or blue, has a 50 percent probability of being chosen.
After each round, each participant will receive feedback about: * the color chosen in Phase 1 of the round and the color chosen in Phase 2 of the roujnd. * the number of tokens available to you at the beginning of the round. * the number of tokens that you paid out during the round (in return for the choice of voting for the color that you prefer in Phase 1 of the round and in Phase 2 of the round).
* the number of tokens that you earned during the round (by having your color of preference chosen in Phase 1 of the round and Phase 2 of the round).
* the number of tokens that you have accumulated thus far. The tokens that you accumulate by the end of the round will be available to you at the beginning of the next round.
After you receive the feedback, the next round begins. It, too, is composed of two phases, and in each phase you will be asked to decide whether you wish to vote for the color that you prefer.
Note: at the beginning of the next round, the groups will be recomposed. The computer will again divide the twenty-one participants in the room, at random, into three different groups of seven participants apiece. Again the computer will give you a message about the color that you prefer in the new round.
At the end of the experiment, the computer will add up the total tokens that you accumulated in all the rounds in the experiment. You will be paid in cash at the exchange rate of four tokens = NIS 1.
Examples: please fill in your answers in the appropriate boxes. If you have questions, raise your hand and the supervisor will come over to you. 
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